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The article presents the results of a scientific study which had been conducted by the author in the 
capital of Greece for five years between 2011 and 2016 in two phases. The aim of the sociological analy-
sis is the representation of irregular immigration as an autonomous independent social phenomenon. 
on the basis of the endogenous and exogenous socio-economic conditions of its own reproduction 
some forms of immigration transformed into the shadow market, actively cooperating with other mar-
kets, legal and illegal, for example the real estate market, money laundering, drug trafficking, etc.. as 
a result of such activities the migrant’s shadow market successfully includes and expands in the space 
of the Greek capital. The results of empirical studies reveal the real situation in the segment of undocu-
mented immigration and the smuggling of migrants through the analysis of illegal markets, their re-
production and propagation mechanisms. The author also examines the impact of immigration on the 
shady legal economy, which is embodied in the growth of crime, insecurity and general urban blight. 
In addition, the text presents a critical analysis of the current state policy in the field of immigration 
and possible exit from the current crisis. refs 75.
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в статье представлены результаты научного исследования, которое проводилось автором 
в столице греции в два этапа в период между 2011 и 2016  годами. целью социологического 
анализа является представление нерегулярной иммиграции как автономного самостоятель-
ного социального феномена, который на основе эндогенных и экзогенных социально-эконо-
мических условий собственного воспроизводства преобразовался в теневой рынок, активно 
взаимодействующий с другими рынками, как легитимно функционирующими, так и нелегаль-
ными, — например, рынок недвижимости, отмывания денег, незаконный оборот наркотиков 
и т. д.. в результате такой деятельности теневые рынки мигрантов успешно воспроизводятся 
и расширяются в пространстве столицы греции. Результаты эмпирического исследования рас-
крывают реальное положение дел в сегменте незарегистрированной иммиграции и незаконно-
го ввоза мигрантов через анализ нелегальных рынков, их механизмов воспроизводства и рас-
пространения. Автор также рассматривает воздействие теневой иммиграции на легальную 
экономику, следствие которой — рост преступности, снижение уровня безопасности и общий 
городской упадок. кроме этого, в тексте представлен критический анализ текущей государ-
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ственной политики, касающейся иммигрантов и возможные варианты выхода из сложившей-
ся кризисной ситуации. библиогр. 75 назв.
Ключевые слова: миграция, нерегулярная иммиграция, рынки, теневой рынок, экономиче-
ский кризис.
1. introduction
Greece’s debt crisis, shrinking economy, surging unemployment and the continuous 
waves of irregular immigrants have transformed athens, once considered one of europe’s 
safest and most lively capitals, into a city with a growing public sense of insecurity 
and aesthetic decadence. In particular, the presence of a large rotating number of 
peopleengaged in varying activities in urban public spaces, as well as the emergence of 
deprived neighbourhoods in the heart of the city, have resulted in deviant and criminal 
behaviour, which, along with the economic decline, are destroying the remaining nodes of 
the legal economy in the city. 
This article presents results of a small-scale research, which has been repeated twice. 
The first round was carried out between 2011 and 2013, and the second between 2014 and 
2016.firstly, the article addresses the impact of increasing irregular immigration on the 
development of illegal markets in athens. secondly, it examines the role of economic and 
other interests involved in mass immigration, and thirdly the inner city neighbourhood 
decline and its effects on expanding criminal networks in the context of urban sociology. 
The aim of the current study is to show that irregular immigration is an autonomous 
market, a market that feeds off and interacts with other legal or illegal markets, such as 
real estate and the rental market, money transfer/money laundering, forgery, etc., solely 
interested in reproduction and self-expansion. This analysis can provide a useful insight 
into illegal markets and, in particular, into undocumented immigration and migrant 
smuggling.
2. key concepts and research hypothesis 
according to arlacchi, whose approach I follow in this section of the paper, illegal 
market is “a place or situation in which there is constant exchange of goods and services, 
whose production, marketing and consumption are legally forbidden or severely restrict-
ed by the majority of states or by international legislation” [3, p. 203]. The exchange of 
such goods and services is regardedas an inherent threat to human dignity and the public 
welfare. Multilateral treaties and international conventions for the protection of human 
rights (e.g. slavery, drugs), the outlawing of violence in intrastate disputes, the increasing 
restrictive regulations of the production and sale of certain weapons are some examples 
of legal provisions which, while aiming at the enhancement of collective security and the 
protection of human rights have contributed to the creation of illegal markets. The de-
termination of which goods and services are available in illegal markets depend on the 
relevant legislation, which accompanied economic growth and regulation in the wake of 
the two World Wars. 
however, illegal markets are determined not only by judicial prohibition and regula-
tion, but also by existing opportunities for their development, in particular, the efficiency 
of control and law enforcement mechanisms that seek to prevent and combat activities 
in them. If these mechanisms break down, as can happen in times of political struggle, 
40 Вестник СПбГУ. Социология. 2017. Т. 10. Вып. 1
internal conflict or economic depression, then organized crime and anomie can emerge as 
a result of inadequate law enforcement activity.
crime, like any other economic activity, can be supplied through various market 
structures. The logic of a market is to locate economic activities where they are most prof-
itable. organised crime emerges and develops because of the dynamics of the illegal mar-
kets in which it operates. Thus, illegal markets constitute the source of income for organ-
ized crime, but not every criminal economic activity constitutes an illegal market.
Illegal markets depend on the high demand of certain goods and services which are 
illegal, and less supply, on their expected profitability for the suppliers, but also on their 
financial and organizational capacities to produce and/or distribute the good and bypass 
law enforcement. like the purchasers, the suppliers must be willing to overcome difficul-
ties and risks associated with the illegality of their activities. They primarily aim at main-
taining a stable consumption rate in order to have profits, and reducing competition.
The characteristics of illegal markets are a) the over-commercialisation of goods and 
services; b) their ability to use in parallel economic, political and military resources; c) the 
high costs of deals because of the clandestine operation in order to decrease the risks, i.e. 
confiscation of goods, deception and liquidation of the enterprise; and d) the absence of 
legal coercion which is generally accepted for the fulfilling of contracts.
They have similarities as well as differences with legal economy. The similarities are 
that both have vendors, vendees, salesmen, buyers, intermediaries, distributors, import-
ers, losses and profits. both have antagonistic and oligopolistic sector. The oligopolistic 
sector provides the competitive sector with goods and services and has access to natural 
resources. The competitive sector includes sMes trafficking of goods and services to the 
public, which is the final consumer [4, p. 234]. The differences are that in these markets 
dominate clandestine networks because of high risk. The risk is related to the frequency 
of distribution, the type of goods (e.g. illegal immigrants, guns, drugs), the type of com-
mercial relations that are necessary for their distribution (personal, by phone) and the 
respective policy of the state about the distribution, use or consumption of the product 
(liberal-prohibitive/repressive).as already referred to, the danger is related to the inability 
of the criminal organisations to be protected by state police and justice.
In order to operate the Illegal markets need funds, a coercion mechanism, and neu-
tralization of law enforcement (formal social control) [60].
Neutralization is attained by 
a) bribing state officials;
b) ensuring/obtaining consensus from the population about the activities;
c) reselling consensus to politicians;
d) establishing of mutual economic interests with representatives of political authori-
ties in order to monopolize a legal source of revenues (e.g. public procurements, procure-
ments of defence equipment), or with the participation of the criminal organization in 
bigger networks of power; and
e) reducing dangers and risks by minimizing the chain of interacting persons and 
organizations, or with the cooperation of people with the same ethnic origin or race, dis-
persed in various countries and social interdepending (‘tradediasporas’) [12, p. 83–100].
eUroPol’s socta report [17, p. 13] and its latest Public Information [18, p. 10] 
notes that organized criminal groupsin source or transit countries exploit ethnic and 
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nationalties to diaspora communities,which offer them an established presence in market 
countriesacross the eU, including legal business structures, facilities and transportation.
The last oc report of the hellenic Police (2012–13) [31] refers that the biggest Illegal 
markets in Greece aremigrants’ smuggling, drug trafficking, organized robberies and 
thefts, and cigarettes’ contraband. 
Migrant smuggling will be defined as a business transaction between two willing 
parties involving movement across borders, usually by illegal means. It occurs with the 
consent of a person or persons, and the transaction usually ends upon arrival. human 
trafficking, in contrast, begins with one party depriving another of the freedom of choice 
by using threats, force, coercion or deception for the purpose of exploitation (i.e. putting 
another party into slavery-like conditions). It is a violation of basic human rights, which 
can occur across and within borders. Despite the differences between migrant smuggling 
and human trafficking, smuggled persons may become victims of human trafficking at any 
point in the smuggling process. 
Illegal immigration is the result of smuggling as an organized group process, as well 
as being done by individuals. human trafficking is not included in this research, while 
migrant smuggling is discussed only in so far as it helps our analysis of irregular immigra-
tion. There are three key parameters that differentiate the types of immigration from each 
other [15]. The first involves whether the migration is intended to be temporary or perma-
nent. The second parameter is whether migration involves skilled or unskilled labour. The 
third is the legality of migration, which is the most interesting for the present study. The 
versions of these characteristics are not of equal importance, while some can be ignored. 
Thus, we focus on illegal immigration of unskilled labour, permanent or temporary.
The 2009 octa report of eUroPol analysed criminal activities through the crimi-
nal hubs concept. This is an analysis of organised crime groups and criminal markets 
under the prism of their interaction within and without territorial entities. In this way, 
complex situations that have widespread effects remain in focus. such tangled situations 
are based on considerations which take into account criminal activities in terms of geo-
graphical flows and facilitating factors, as well as organised crime groups in relation to 
their intentions and capabilities. 
The present analysis regards undocumented immigration as an autonomous market, 
a self-reproducing system which has the capacity to maintain a loose coupling not only 
with the other systems consisting of its environment, but also with its own parts [55]. This 
scheme can provide the analysis of illegal markets and in particular of irregular immigra-
tion and migrant smuggling with more aspects, contributing to its better understanding. 
The irregular migration has been developed to a market for three main reasons: the 
restrictions on legal immigration imposed by developed countries; the increasing demand 
for entry into these countries; and the comparatively low risks and high profits involved in 
migrant smuggling. In order to maximize the economic return on their activities, migrant 
smugglers use existing structures and concepts in legitimate businesses, such as organiza-
tion, human resources, supply, production, distribution and finance. 
Nevertheless, illegal migration has also developed its own ‘infrastructure’ for organ-
izing transfers and clandestine border crossings, as well as support mechanisms after ar-
rival, such as housing, employment, documentation, protection of rights and provision of 
legal aid, etc. in the host or the transit country. This ‘infrastructure’ reproduces demand 
from potential migrants, who, after successful entry into the host or transit country, send 
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money home — thus encouraging more potential immigrants. The system is supported 
simultaneously by accountants, lawyers, politicians, civil servants, civil society organiza-
tions, corporate executives and professional criminals in the host or transit country (of-
fer), but the main factors driving its reproduction are the continuing wars and conflict 
worldwide. from the immigrants’ point of view the system is reproduced by the hope 
(value) of a better life and safety(target), while the interests of the various entrepreneurs 
and criminal networks, as well as of other interested parties, are wealth, power and expan-
sion of their operation.
There are numerous opinions with regard to the costs and benefits of immigration 
[28, p. 19–26]. critics of illegal immigration argue that an influx of undocumented im-
migrants brings high economic costs by lowering domestic wages and raising public ex-
penditure in some areas, such as health care and education. In terms of strict economic 
policy, it does support arguments in favour of restricting illegal immigration, but the costs 
are unknown.
It can also be argued that funds spent on reducing irregular immigration would vastly 
exceed the income gained from eliminating the net fiscal transfer to illegal immigrants. 
however, illegal immigration is not only a cost-benefit issue. since it is illegal, it is also 
related to the underground economy, making the cost-benefit ratio difficult to estimate. 
With regard to Greece, as a ‘host’ or ‘transit’ state, the high rate of illegal immigration 
certainly creates wealth for individual entrepreneurs or groups and even political capi-
tal. Various markets are constructed and reproduced around irregular immigration, while 
having a number of other consequences. In addition, it is very difficult to estimate costs 
and benefits for the immigrants, although the continuing stream of immigration indicates 
that the benefits outweigh the risks in undertaking migration.
Illegal migration of unskilled people is not an outcome of different, unconnected 
causes, but a system with its own logic [48]. The first priority for illegal migration is to 
remain illegal as a business. only under these conditions can it achieve its purposes. Mi-
grant smuggling and illegal migration can be understood as a ‘parasite’ in the sense of 
Michel serres’ communication theory — developing nests and then colonizing the sys-
tems with which they communicate and finally transforming system aims and outcomes 
in order to serve the parasite [63].
serres’ concept of the parasite provides grounds for a rethinking of basic categories 
in human social science. The parasite is essential to thinking about communication and 
transformation in systems. Parasitism operates through the logic of taking without giv-
ing. Nevertheless, the parasite makes exchange possible by creating connections between 
otherwise incommensurable entities creating collectivity [11, p. 13–16].
system theorists have used this term to indicate systems whose major task is how 
to annul the declared (legal) function of any other social system with which it commu-
nicates, and to transform its goals and outcomes in a similar way [63]. If we consider the 
legal system an external environment of illegal migration (in addition to the economy, 
public administration, politics, culture, education, etc.), then the parasite influences their 
regular function and structures for the fulfilment of its own purposes. as a result, all the 
subsystems that support illegal immigration in one way or another do nothing more than 
perpetrate the flow of immigrants and the underground economy surrounding it. 
comparing an organized criminal group to an ‘enterprise’ or ‘firm’ and its key 
personnel to ‘entrepreneurs’ was a significant step to viewing its illegal activities as a 
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business process [20, 60]. yet it was not until the early 1990s that criminologists began 
to study the logistics of specific illegal activities. It would also be useful to examine illegal 
markets as parasitic to the legal economy. recently, there have been studies in economic 
sociology examining illegal markets operating parasitically on or symbiotically with legal 
markets, and the issue of how the parasite makes a profit for the illegal markets from the 
value construction of legal markets [7].
3. Methods used in empirical research
In general, according to Klaus von lampe [7], three means of data collection have 
been used for the study of transnational organized crime and the illegal markets relating 
to it: observations, interviews and the retrieval of information stored electronically or on 
paper. sometimes, different types of data sources are combined in the same research pro-
ject. Participant observations have been rare and risky. an increasing number of studies 
rely on interviews with offenders, both those in prison and those in the community. 
There are difficulties with these means of data collection: studies can lack detail re-
garding the modus operandi of offenders, the logistics of transnational criminal activities 
and the nature of groups’ structures in the sense of forms of cooperation (e.g. market 
transactions between independent actors, network cooperation). In addition, only one 
area is usually examined (e.g. the destination country of smuggling), while the nature of 
activities and groups in source and transit countries is usually speculation.
another difficulty is differential access for researchers to data sources/owners and the 
willingness of governments, law enforcement authorities, NGos and the private sector, 
etc. to cooperate with the researchers. likewise, the range and quality of data collected 
and processed by law enforcement agencies, local or governmental authorities and private 
organizations (e.g. commercial associations/unions) are very different to those needed by 
researchers.
The sources used for the present research include police, media and international or-
ganizations’ reports (eUroPol, frontex, World bank, IMf, United Nations high com-
missioner for refugees [UNhcr], Us Department of state), Parliamentary proceedings, 
sessional proceedings of the athens city council and of the council for the integration of 
immigrants, information provided and data submitted by local authorities, and data from 
national strategic analysts.
The methods used were field research and interviews with representatives of local 
government, representatives of the financial and economic crime Unit of the ministry 
of finance, of the coast Guard, police officers and numerous city residents and entrepre-
neurs. from January 2011 until october 2012, systematic observation in community and 
town councils was carried out whenever relevant topics were on the agendas of local coun-
cil meetings (usually every two weeks). afterwards, the observation was periodically con-
ducted until July 2015. No interviews with immigrants (shop owners, customers, people 
standing nearby) have been carried out, owing to their unwillingness and understandable 
suspiciousness, as well as the personal safety of the researcher.
field research was conducted in November 2010, January, september and December 
2011, october 2012, March and November 2013, october 2014, January 2015, and May 
2016. In particular, the licensing of new ‘enterprises of hygiene interest’ (Kye) as they 
are officially called (e.g. barber shops, minimarkets, internet shops), their type, street and 
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community of operation, entrepreneur(s) and staff, their infringements (e.g. unlicensed 
operation, irregular goods’ transfer, violations of health and hygiene legislation), sanc-
tions for violations (e.g. review of the request-compliance control, license suspension, 
temporary closing of the shop) have been examined.
4. Results: immigration inc.
4.1. Accommodation and work
since 2007–08  a large wave of unskilled illegal immigrants from asia and africa, 
dissimilar to that in the 1990s from the former communist balkan countries, has entered 
Greece. The majority have settled in athens and other big cities. These people, chiefly 
working-age males, have entered a city with no available jobs to offer them all, a situation 
that has degenerated even further due to the followed debt crisis.
The centre of athens has been used from the beginning for the mass accommodation 
of immigrants by smugglers. large and deteriorating buildings in the centre of athens 
were filled by thousands of undocumented immigrants who lived there on a monthly ro-
tation, where they pay organized criminals €2–5 per day for ‘rent’ [31]. soon afterwards, 
authorities say that the leaders of these syndicates have bought the buildings and can thus 
provide shelter for those whom they have smuggled into the country. hence, the syndi-
cates acquired considerable illegal funds, taking also into account that they do the mini-
mum to maintain the living standards of their property [52]. apart from these profits, they 
acquire high earnings from using immigrants to sell narcotics and other products as illegal 
street vendors, from prostituting them or finding them temporary manual labour, one 
example being occasionally aggressive panhandling by cleaning car windows or selling 
sundries at traffic lights, while charging the immigrants a commission on their ‘sales’.
real estate companies as well, have either bought or rented many apartments to shel-
ter the immigrants [64, p. 210–231]. certain neighbour hoods operate as temporal (tran-
sitional) places of residence slowly declining and showing significant signs of stress. 
as a consequence several native inhabitants have abandoned the neighbourhoods 
and either rent or sold their property at very low prices to these criminal networks, usually 
represented by real estate agencies. In spring of 2015, with the start of the refugee crisis, 
hundreds of thousands of people along with the refugees have freely entered from the sea 
borders. a large number of people have fled the camps where they are required to stay 
until they are identified and they go inland, and mainly to the capital city. The dwelling 
demand in the city has escalated. Now the UN refugees’ agency, among others, has started 
renting dozens of free apartments and houses of inhabitants who have left the city, as well 
as entire hotels in the same areas to shelter the people. The neighbourhoods have been 
inevitably further degenerated.
The Greek National Intelligence service produced a report in early 2011  that was 
leaked to a daily newspaper, in which it stated that crime syndicates have been able to 
create pro-immigrant NGos [29], buy real estate and create ‘zones of influence’ within 
athens, so as to construct their ghettos and evade police surveillance. In addition, the 
intelligence report noted that organized criminal groups have made the necessary ‘invest-
ments’ by buying influence in certain sectors of public opinion, so as to neutralize opposi-
tion in many cases.
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furthermore, among the Wikileaks Us diplomatic cables revelations [40], it was 
noted that a former american ambassador in athens had held talks with Greek officials 
(the Minister of citizen Protection and the chief of the National Police), pointing out 
the existence of certain ethnic networks that smuggle immigrants into the country, and 
that are believed to be related to radical Islamist groups in southeast asia. a detailed 
newspaper report already in 2010 stated that the number of Muslim extremists reaching 
Greece through illegal immigration channels is also increasing and that dozens of ‘under-
the-table’ money transfer facilities exist. These, it states, are usually owned by immigrants 
from Muslim countries and facilitate substantial money laundering operations in Greece. 
five years later, the same newspaper along with others revealed police information that 
Greece has been used as a passage for radical Muslims to other countries of europe, 
exploiting the immigrants’ and refugees’ waves entering the country since 2015. attacks in 
Paris in November 2015 and in brussels in March 2016 were made with the support of the 
network of foreign ‘fighters’ of the Islamic state in athens. Moreover, the belgian journal 
La Province reported that the only survivor and arrestee for the 13 November 2015 Paris 
attacks, salah abdeslam, led ten terrorists to belgium via Greece, hungary and Germany.
4.2. Contraband goods and travel documents
one of the most profitable businesses and jobs for irregular immigrants is illegal 
outdoor trading of contraband goods. a special task force created by the Greek tax service 
uncovered seven illegal warehouses between october 2010 and March 2011 [52]. stored 
within these facilities were illegally traded goods, such as clothing, bags and furniture, 
with a value of over €30 million. Illegal trade undercuts the turnover of legal merchants 
and shop owners, threatens jobs thus accentuating the recession of the legitimate economy.
Moreover, according to the statement of the coordination body for contraband-
control consisting of Police members, financial crime Unit, customs, and Inspection 
teams of illegal street vendors (Ministry of Development and competitiveness / Kelaye), 
131,349 inspections have been carried out in 2013 in contrast with 24,700 inspections in 
2012 (431% increase), while 10,793,372 units have been seized compared to 2,052,483 units 
in 2012  (an increase of 425%).The Police headquarters evaluating the four months 
operations of ‘xenios Zeus’ (4.8–4.12.2012)  stated inter alia that nine warehouses and 
other places have been identified with over three million contraband items and smuggled 
products [32].
In March 2011, the economic newspaper IMerIsIa using the data of the Institute of 
trade and services (INeMy) of the National confederation of Greek commerce (esee), 
estimated that the contraband turnover was €20 billion. This means that losses for the state 
revenues from Vat and taxes reached €8.5 billion. In Greek Parliamentary Proceedings 
(2011) [5], the turnover of the illegal trade is estimated to be between €7 and €10 billion 
annually, and results in a loss of about €4 billion in state income. a year later, the president 
of the athens chamber of commerce and Industry (accI) estimated the annual losses to 
state revenues to be a minimum of €6 billion, while the impact on legitimate businesses is 
€25 billion due to the loss of market turnover, significantly higher than the figures referred 
to in Parliamentary Proceedings [2, p. 66]. In regard to the illicit cigarette trade as an 
income source for migrant smuggling rings and other criminal groups, indicatively, it is 
worth mentioning that in october 2015 the coast Guard in Piraeus port seized a container 
with 500 thousand packages, i.e. 10 million smuggled cigarettes destined for the Greek 
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market. according to the General secretariat of Public revenues, the respective duties 
and taxes are estimated at €1.8 million [31]. The report of the transcrime Institute of the 
University of tren to in Italy estimates that the criminal proceeds from cigarette smuggling 
for the eU28, only for 2013 ranged from €8,452 to 10,294 billion, and for Greece, from 
€416–494 million [2]. The situation, however, appears to be quite complicated.
according to the General secretary of the trade Union of small vendors in Greece 
“the illegal vendors operate under the umbrella of some importers who circulate incred-
ible amounts of money. to control illegal trade importers of smuggled goods should be 
addressed first. These importers are known, are members of trade unions. It is about a 
huge turnover in which Greek and foreign capital participates”.
apart from contraband goods, there is also a widespread forgery industry for travel 
documents in general, and in the research area in particular, with most networks originat-
ing from two specific asian communities. Police sources, press publications and anecdotal 
evidence from citizens during our research confirmed this. During a raid in february 
2011, the Greek special forces recovered around 500 fake travel documents and stolen 
official stamps belonging to such groups; several raids followed with similar results [31].
In 2012 a Sunday Times investigation by an undercover reporter found that criminal 
gangs in athens were renting genuine passports and identity documents to thousands of 
illegal immigrants, enabling them to enter eU countries undetected. The gang charged 
immigrants €1,000 to hire the identity documents, which they used to pass through bor-
der controls. In March 2016 the Wall Street Journal published a similar article after fy-
roM closed its borders with Greece.
forgery of official documents is of vital concern for police and counter-terrorism 
authorities, since the groups often need multiple sources of false identification to travel 
internationally and successfully evade governments that may have blacklisted them. With 
the ongoing crises in North africa and the Middle east exacerbating an exodus of refugees 
fleeing to europe and migrants along with them, the trade in fraudulent or doctored pa-
pers (Greek i.e. eU, or syrian passport) represents a major ‘growth industry’ for criminal 
groups involved in migrant smuggling in Greece today [24, p. 18, 42]. even if forged docu-
ments have nothing to do with facilitating terrorist activities, this option cannot be ex-
cluded. eUroPol itself underlines that counterfeit documents constitute a direct threat 
to the security of the eU, especially when they are used to conceal the identity of terrorists 
and dangerous criminals [17, p. 17].
4.3. Remittance outflow and informal value transfer (IVT)
It would be at least short-sighted and biased to imply that the remittances of 
immigrants, regular or not, are products of illegal enterprises. The study is restricted to 
organised crime groups.
a prerequisite for the operation of illegal markets and the underground economy is 
both entrepreneurship and employment that warrants a rudimentary economic activity, 
as well as unofficial and therefore undeclared transactions and money laundering. There 
are many ways to conduct an informal money transfer; the best known is hawala or hundi 
which is also regarded as the most organised system in the Middle east and south asia by 
the IMf [37, p. 4–17].
a wide range of methods and networks operate in similar ways and offer comparable 
services (e.g. charities, internet-based payments/transfers of stored value, such as pre-paid 
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telephone cards, debit and credit cards used by multiple individual brokerage accounts) 
[58]. other communities, such as eastern europeans, tend to make greater use of hand-
carrying of cash — by themselves or by a trusted relative or friend — or courier services 
and mostly transport operators [44; 45].
Underground remittance activity, particularly that which is carried out by immigrants, 
serves a legitimate need, but also offers a potential for misuse for money laundering /
terrorism financing purposes. for instance, due to the lack of effective monitoring, 
anonymous customer transactions can take place and customer’s beneficial owner can 
be hidden. The financial action task force (fatf) on money laundering and financing 
of terrorism has issued recommendations that urge countries to implement a regulatory 
framework by licensing or registering money or value transfer providers and further to 
monitor their compliance with those laws, creating and imposing of sanctions [19].
a) The World bank, the IMf and the european commission have stepped up 
efforts to calculate the outflow through alternative remittance systems based 
on the legal outflow, which however remains difficult [39]. This is also obvious 
in the case of Greece. according to the World bank’s data [70], the transfers 
back to their home countries from immigrant households in Greece legally in 
2008 was Us$1,912 billion, in 2009 Us$1,843 billion, in 2010 Us$1,932 billion, in 
2011 Us$1,941 billion-Dwindling numbers of legal businesses, which has been 
intensified by the economic crisis.
b) a sharp drop in real estate prices (official and commercial land price).
c) social, aesthetic and economic neighbourhood degradation, leading to 
ghettoization.
d) Increased opportunities for crime and grey economy taking advantage of social 
unrest, economic and political instability.
e) serious difficulties for law enforcement authorities to face and control the 
intensive law violations and the expansion of criminality committed by a large 
number of people which is constantly revolving. 
f) expansion of criminal networks as a result of poor governance and law enforce-
ment, budget cuts due to economic crisis, and reluctance or inability of local gov-
ernment to support an efficient control.
g) Neighbourhood disintegration.
h) crumbling social cohesion, poverty and neighbourhood change.
5. neighbourhood change models and disorganization
research, mainly by american scholars, has shown that the degradation and 
disorganization of an urban area in architectural and aesthetic appearance is not an isolated 
negative situation, but has implications for the wider social fabric, feeding lawlessness and 
crime. The broken windows theory of James Wilson and George Kelling [69] suggested, 
30 years ago, that signs of disorderly and petty criminal behaviour might trigger more 
disorder and escalation into more serious crime. This may effect a decline in the quality of 
life of the neighbourhood’s inhabitants.
Neighbourhood change and decline has been an issue in urban sociology and human 
ecology since the beginning of the 20th century. although the topic of this article is not the 
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analysis of neighbourhood change, it would be helpful to draw an outline, while having in 
mind the community zones of the present study.
extremely varied analyses and interpretations have designated diverse causes for 
urban shrinkage. These explanations are sometimes concurrent and often complementary.
The earliest model of neighbourhood change is the chicago school sociological theo-
ry of ‘invasion-succession’ developed by Park and burgess [56], and is regarded as classic. 
according to them, as one population moves into or ‘invades’ a neighbourhood, the origi-
nal population leaves or ‘secedes’[27, p. 4]. The model was used to describe the processes 
of alteration in neighbourhood population that in turn change land use and the commer-
cial structure or dominant activities of the neighbourhood [61]. for example, a few im-
migrants who are content with tenement style dwelling begin to populate — by themselves 
or supported by real estate companies and proprietors — a neighbourhood to the chagrin 
of the original residents, who eventually leave. succession is the end of the process, when 
the area has changed completely from its former character [62]. The model is criticized as 
highly deterministic, because it sees neighbourhood change as inevitable [38].
another significant approach, introduced by hoyt [35] and developed by smith 
[65], explains neighbourhood change as a result of decisions made by property owners. 
according to this model, as buildings age and the maintenance costs rise, homeowners 
and landlords will invest decreasing amounts of capital in them. rather than making home 
repairs, more affluent residents move out of the neighbourhood into areas with newer 
homes. studies by fujita, as well as leven and associates demonstrate empirical support 
for the idea that the more affluent will sacrifice commute time for housing quality [26].
Within the framework of the above models several theoretical orientations have 
evolved [50], such as the demographic-ecological orientation and the political-economic 
perspective [62]. The demographic-ecological perspective focuses on the adaptation 
of the population to its environment [30]. The key demographic element making for 
neighbourhood population change is migration. a major interest in human ecology is 
the extent to which neighbourhoods maintain their social organization under continued 
population turnover. 
The emergence of a political economy perspective is one of the more interesting trends 
in modern neighbourhood analysis. The approach views community change in terms 
of the complex connections among economic and political institutions and the various 
segments of the business and housing markets. according to this approach, the city’s 
growth is guided by a set of affluent land interests. These interests operate through inter-
organizational connections in such a way that there is an uneven distribution across the 
city of the benefits of development and revitalization. The winners are always the wealthy 
[62, p. 92–97]. research has been carried out on the ways institutions operate to control 
the urban land market. The political economy orientation places neighbourhood change 
in the broader perspective of change in the total urban system. for example, Downs [13] 
argues that the fate of any neighbourhood is not determined by neighbourhood councils 
or individual actors, but by economic, political and social forces outside its boundaries. 
The options for neighbourhood response are limited.
several elements of the above perspectives seem to apply to our cases, but a focused 
research study should be conducted. from my peripheral view the most relevant seems to 
be the invasion-succession model along with the demographic-ecological and the political 
economy perspective. 
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Unfortunately, in athens a growing segregation is obvious, which the policies of the 
local government are also facilitating, rather than preventing. segregation and decline is 
not uniformly expressed across all urban territories. International research has shown this 
exactly; that the decline can be more or less attenuated or exacerbated by locally applied 
urban, social, and economic policies [23, p. 16].
6. discussion and conclusions
eighty-six per cent of the detections of irregular migrants in 2011 on the eU’s ex-
ternal borders occurred in two areas, the central Mediterranean (46%) and the eastern 
Mediterranean, primarily on the land border between Greece and turkey (40%) [24]. In 
2015 the number of persons who illegally entered Greece rose to 911,471 in comparison 
with the 77,163 in 2014 (increase +1,081%). arrested traffickers were 1,501 and 1,171 re-
spectively [34]. from the people who passed the Greek borders, 499,495 (54.8%) declared 
that they were coming from syria, 213,267 (23.4%) from afghanistan, 91,769 (10%) from 
Iraq, while the rest (11.8%) from Pakistan, Iran, albania, Palestine, Morocco, somalia, 
algeria, bangladesh, lebanon et al. 
Greek borders are too porous and practically impossible to seal. It is certain that 
Greece will unfortunately remain in the forefront of the eU’s illegal-immigration problem 
for some time. austerity measures and the economic downturn in Greece have affected its 
capacity to perform alone border controls in the intensity corresponding to the volume of 
the flow, and prevent a wide array of illegal activities at the borders, ranging from illegal 
border crossing to smuggling of duty goods and drugs. such situations enable facilita-
tors to select those border types and sections that are perceived as weaker [24, p. 5]. It is 
interesting to note the recent rapid change by smugglers in their choice of the main entry 
point to Greece, who now once more use islands near the turkish sea borders because the 
northern border control has been strengthened.
In its latest report, frontex underlines that in 2015, roughly 2,044,000 illegal border 
crossings by non-regional migrants (who are not citizens of non eU balkan countries) en 
routefrom turkey, Greece and bulgaria were reported at the common and regional borders. 
This is a number that is unprecedented and beyond comparison with any previous period. 
The flows also exposed holes in border control management, especially in the absence 
of uniform eU-wide migration and asylum policies, as well as a temporary suspension 
of national and eU border-management legislation [25, p. 4–5, 12] The smugglers took 
advantage of the inconsistent and uncoordinated eU-member states policy and rhetoric 
for the promotion of their services.
The rapid growth of illegal markets in Greece, which is linked to the dramatic in-
crease in irregular immigration and economic turbulence, also has a crucial relationship 
with the existence of powerful criminal networks in the wider south-eastern european 
region [52; 53]. The short-term immigration policy of Greek governments during the last 
two decades and their limitationsin negotiations with the eU facilitated various parlia-
mentary and non-parliamentary political groups and other organized interests to exploit 
the growth for their own benefit. such conditions could also indirectly aid fundraising for 
criminal networks in the country.
The internal and external situation has further consequences for the physical and 
social disorder of cities, as described above. timely control prevents aggravation of the 
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intensity and extent of the problem. In contrast, the weakening of law enforcement and 
social control increases delinquency and leads to law-abiding citizens abandoning the re-
gion. Thus, crime and delinquency become consolidated in the area [43]. The appropriate 
environmental design, which takes into account morphological and qualitative charac-
teristics of the urbanspace, may lead to a significant reduction in crime and anomie. re-
search at the Universities of harvard and suffolk in the Us in 2005 [9], as well as at the 
University of Groningen in The Netherlands in 2008 [42], found that the most effective 
measure to control crime in urbanareas is the restoration of social order and the aesthetic 
improvement of the environment.
yet, the renewal of towns and public places requires the belief of democracy in itself 
and its institutions, principles and values. It requires the identification of problematic situ-
ations as delinquency and not as alternative social realities, and a pragmatic law enforce-
ment policy against crime and disorder [46]. This is of much significance for Greece, and 
athens in particular, which have been suffering under the dominance of certain rhetoric 
during the last 20 years and the governments’ short-sightedness.
to return to serres’ arguments presented briefly at the beginning of this chapter, a 
parasite functions by destabilizing and transforming a system that it has penetrated. how-
ever, according to serres, the parasite is the guarantor for the viability of the host. The 
parasite system needs the host as much as itself. Is this applicable to the networks of mi-
grant smuggling and exploitation, and the criminal groups?
luhmann uses the parasite example from a different perspective. Parasitic systems 
and networks not only use the opportunities for acting and deciding within functional 
systems and their organizations exclusively for themselves, i.e. for their own members and 
for the development and reinforcement of the network, but they also absorb the attention 
and resources of the ‘host’ system. In this way, networks are also responsible for what is 
generally called ‘corruption’ of the system 51. The parasite may benefit from the weakness 
of the host, and destroying it. such asymmetric structures cannot be ignored.
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